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Biometric Authentication System
on Mobile Personal Devices
Qian Tao and Raymond Veldhuis
Abstract—We propose a secure, robust, and low-cost biomet-
ric authentication system on the mobile personal device for the
personal network. The system consists of the following five key
modules: 1) face detection; 2) face registration; 3) illumination
normalization; 4) face verification; and 5) information fusion.
For the complicated face authentication task on the devices with
limited resources, the emphasis is largely on the reliability and
applicability of the system. Both theoretical and practical consid-
erations are taken. The final system is able to achieve an equal
error rate of 2% under challenging testing protocols. The low
hardware and software cost makes the system well adaptable to
a large range of security applications.
Index Terms—Biometric authentication, detection, face, fusion,
illumination, registration, verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN a modern world, there are more and more occasions inwhich our identity must be reliably proved. But what is our
identity? Most often, it is a password, a passport, or a social
security number. The link between such measures and a person,
however, can be weak as they are constantly under the risk of
being lost, stolen, or forged. Biometrics, the unique biological
or behavioral characteristics of a person, e.g., face, fingerprint,
iris, speech, etc., is one of the most popular and promising
alternatives to solve this problem. Biometrics is convenient as
people naturally carry it and is reliable as it is virtually the only
form of authentication that ensures the physical presence of
the user.
In this paper, we study the biometric authentication problem
on a personal mobile device (MPD) in the context of secure
communication in a personal network (PN). A PN is a user
centric ambient communication environment [19] for unlimited
communication between the user and the personal electronic
devices. An illustration of the PN is shown in Fig. 1. The
biometric authentication system is envisaged as a secure link
between the user and the user’s PN, providing secure access
of the user to the PN. Such an application puts forward the
following three requirements of the biometric authentication
system: 1) security; 2) convenience; and 3) complexity.
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Security is the primary reason for introducing biometric au-
thentication into the PN. There are two types of authentication
in the MPD scenarios: 1) authentication at logon time and
2) authentication at run time. In addition to logon time authenti-
cation, run time authentication is also important because it can
prevent unauthorized users from taking an MPD in operation
and accessing confidential user information from the PN. To
quantify the biometric authentication performance with respect
to security, the false acceptance rate (FAR) is used, specifying
the probability that an impostor can use the device. It is required
that FAR be low for security concerns.
The false rejection rate (FRR), which specifies the proba-
bility that the authentic user is rejected, is closely related to
user convenience. A false rejection will force the user to reenter
biometric data, which causes considerable inconvenience. This
leads to the requirement of a low FRR of the biometric authen-
tication system. Furthermore, in terms of convenience, a higher
degree of user-friendliness can be achieved if the biometric au-
thentication is transparent, which means that the authentication
can be done without explicit user actions. Transparency should
also be considered as a prerequisite for the authentication at run
time, as regularly requiring a user who may be concentrating
on a task to present the biometric data is neither practical nor
convenient.
Generally speaking, a mobile device has limited resources
of computation. Because the MPD operates in the PN, it offers
the possibility that biometric templates be stored in a central
database and that the authentication is done in the network.
Although the constraints on the algorithmic complexity become
less stringent, the option brings a higher security risk. First,
when biometric data have to be transmitted over the network
it is vulnerable to eavesdropping [5]. Second, the biometric
templates need to be stored in a database and are vulnerable
to attacks [30]. Conceptually, it is also preferable to make the
MPD authentication more independent of other parts of the PN.
Therefore, it is required that the biometric authentication be
done locally on the MPD. More specifically, the hardware (i.e.,
biometric sensor) should be inexpensive, and the software (i.e.,
algorithm) should have low computational complexity.
In this paper, we developed a secure, convenient, and low-
cost biometric authentication system on the MPD for the PN.
The biometric that we chose is the 2-D face image, taken by the
low-end camera on the MPD. Two-dimensional face image is
by far one of the best biometrics that compromises well among
accuracy, transparency, and cost [37]. The user authentication,
therefore, is done by analyzing the face images of the person
who intends to logon into the PN or who is operating the
MPD. The only requirement in using this system is that the user
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Fig. 1. User in the PN.
Fig. 2. Diagram of the biometric authentication system on the MPD.
presents his or her face in a more or less frontal way within the
capture range of the camera.
Although the subproblems of face recognition (like registra-
tion, illumination, classification, etc.) have been addressed in
many publications [22], [52], [53], there have been very few
publications describing a complete face recognition system,
particularly for small mobile devices with limited computa-
tional resources. We propose a biometric authentication system
consisting of the following five key important modules, as
illustrated in Fig. 2: 1) face detection; 2) face registration;
3) illumination normalization; 4) face authentication; and
5) information fusion. Following the same order, this paper
is organized as follows. Sections II and III present the real-
time and robust face detection and registration algorithms,
Section IV presents the illumination normalization method,
Section V describes the face verification method for the
processed face patterns, and Section VI describes the informa-
tion fusion between different time frames. Section VII presents
the experimental setup and result, and Section VIII gives the
conclusion.
II. FACE DETECTION
Face detection is the initial step for face authentication.
Although the detection of the face is an easy visual task for
a human, it is a complicated problem for computer vision due
to the fact that face is a dynamic object, subject to a high
degree of variability, originating from both external and inter-
nal changes. An extensive literature exists on automatic face
detection [24], [52].
The known face detection methods can be categorized into
the following two large groups: 1) heuristic-based methods and
2) classification-based methods. Examples of the first category
include skin color methods and facial geometry methods [21],
[25], [33], [38]. The heuristic methods are often simple to
implement but are not reliable as the heuristics are often vul-
nerable to exterior changes. In comparison, classification-based
methods are able to deal with much more complex scenarios,
because they treat face detection as a pattern classification
problem and, thus, benefit largely from the existing pat-
tern classification resources. The biggest disadvantage of the
classification-based methods, however, is their high compu-
tational load as the patterns to be classified must cover the
exhaustive set of image patches at any location and scale of
the input image, as shown in Fig. 3.
The Viola–Jones face detector is one of the most successful
face detection methods [50]. There are three characteristics in
this method, which are listed as follows: 1) Haar-like features
that can be rapidly calculated across all scales; 2) Adaboost
training to select and weight the features [16], [39], [50]; and
3) cascaded classifier structure to speed up the detection. In
comparison to other advanced features like Gabor wavelets
in the elastic bunch graph matching (EBGM) [51] and Gabor
wavelet network [18], the Haar-like features are extremely fast
to compute, and most importantly, they form key points for
scalable computation and, thus, rapid search through scales and
locations. For details, see [50]. The face detector only needs to
be trained once and then stored for any general-purpose face
detection. These characteristics enable real-time robust face
detection.
For the application of face detection on the MPD in particu-
lar, we propose strategies that can further improve the detection
speed. The specificity of the face images in the MPD applica-
tion is related to the distribution of face sizes in the normal self-
taken photos from a handheld device. This information provides
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Fig. 3. Exhaustive set of candidates at any location and scale of the input image, where x is the basic classification unit to be classified.
Fig. 4. (Left) Typical face images taken from ordinary handheld PDA (Eten M600), with the size 320 × 240. (Right) Downscaled face images with the size
100 × 75. Equally good face detection results can be obtained in both the original and the downscaled images.
useful constraints on the searching and significantly speeds up
the implementation. In Fig. 4 (left), some typical face images
taken from ordinary handheld personal digital assistant (PDA;
Eten M600) are shown.
Suppose the detected face size s lies in a scope between
smin and smax, we propose two steps to reduce the computa-
tional efforts for face detection: First, downscale the original
image before detection. The downscaling factor is set around
smin/sface, where stemplate is the size of the training tem-
plate, i.e., minimally detectable size. In the trained detectors,
stemplate = 24. Second, in the reduced image, restrict the scan-
ning window to be from the minimal size 24 to the maximal
size 24(smax/smin).
Referring to Fig. 3, it can easily be seen that the number
of candidates for classification increases exponentially with
the size of the input image. The first step, therefore, radically
reduces the number of possible classification units. In addition,
the second step avoids the unnecessary search for faces of too
small or too large sizes. This further reduces the number of clas-
sification units to a large extent. Fig. 4 shows detection results
both in the original and in the reduced image. We observed that
in the latter, almost equally good results are obtained, but with
far less computational load. One drawback of downscaling,
however, is that the detected face scale is coarser than that in
the original image, since much fewer scales have been searched
through. This nevertheless does not affect the final face ver-
ification performance, as is shown in the following section,
where we will further registrate the detected faces to a finer
scale.
III. FACE REGISTRATION
Generally speaking, the location of the detected face is not
precise enough for further analysis of the face content. It has
been emphasized in the literature that face registration is an
essential step after face detection for subsequent face interpreta-
tion task [3], [4], [36]. The following two popular ways of doing
the face registration can be found in the literature: 1) holistic
methods and 2) local methods.
Holistic registration methods take advantage of both global
face texture information and the local facial feature informa-
tion (i.e., locations of eyes, nose, mouth, etc.). Examples are
the active shape model (ASM) [10], active appearance model
(AAM) [9], and their variants. Fitting such models onto the
input face image is often formulated as an iterative optimization
problem. As common to such complex optimization problems,
however, two potential drawbacks of the holistic registration
are the possibility to be trapped into local minimal and the
relatively high computation load, particularly for an MPD. In
contrast, the local registration method is more direct and faster
as it only takes the locations of local facial features to calcu-
late the transformation, not involving any global optimization
process. The disadvantage of the local method, on the other
hand, is that the facial features are very difficult to be reliably
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the false acceptance models. (a) Original detections.
(b) Conventional probabilistic model. (c) Proposed model with type I and
type II errors.
detected [6] due to their high variability and insufficient shape
content.1
We propose a real-time robust facial feature detector based
on the Viola–Jones method, incorporating a novel error model
that is precise and concise. Given that it is, in reality, impossible
to build a reliable facial feature detector with both low FAR and
low FRR, we guarantee the detection of the facial features in the
first place, at the cost of a high number of false detections. The
facial feature detection problem is therefore converted into a
postselection problem of the multiple detected facial features.
A conventional way to do the postselection is to build up
statistical models, like the ASM, of the facial landmark distri-
butions and to select the most likely combination of detected
facial features according to them [6], [12], [13]. The underlying
assumption of these models is that the detected features are
distributed in a probabilistic way around the true locations. This
assumption, however, is not true for the multiple detections that
resulted from the Viola–Jones method. Furthermore, for a user-
specific system, such a model is preferably user specific, but in
practice, this is not possible (no ground-truth data of the user
available), and variances of other subjects will be introduced
by building a general shape model from a number of other
training subjects. Fig. 5(a) shows a typical example of the left-
eye detection. The face sample is from the FERET database
[47], while the left-eye detectors are trained from the manually
labeled BioID database [46].
We build up a new error model for the false detected fa-
cial features. Fundamentally, the Viola–Jones detector uses a
combination of local structures as the template, so all the
patterns that have more or less similar structures are likely to
be detected. With respect to this mechanism, two types of false
acceptances can be identified. The type I false acceptance is
the acceptance of the background patches that coincidentally
have comparable local structures with the facial feature. The
chin shadow that is falsely detected as an eye, as shown in
Fig. 5(a), is a good example of the type I error, as the shadow
has roughly the bright–dark-bright pattern that resembles the
eye texture. The type II false acceptance is the acceptance of
1Shape content refers to the relatively consistent layout of the object pattern.
For example, the face has consistent and sufficient texture patterns of the
facial features (from up down: eyebrows, eyes, nose, mouth) that provide
abundant information to discriminate them from nonface patterns and facilitate
the construction of the detector. For facial features, e.g., eyes and eyebrows,
however, the shape content is far less and more unstable, leading to considerable
overlaps in the distributions of the facial-feature and non-facial-feature classes
and making it difficult to learn the detector.
Fig. 6. Examples of facial feature detection from (a) BioID, (b) FERET, and
(c) YaleB databases and (d) random unconstraint Internet images, with different
illumination, size, pose, and expression.
the patches centered at approximately the same position as
the true facial features, but larger in sizes. A type II error is
caused by the fact that the search is through different scales,
and at a slightly coarser (larger) scale around the true position,
the detected image patches often have similar structures as
the facial feature patch. Both error types can be observed in
Fig. 5(a), and Fig. 5(c) illustrates the proposed model in detail,
in comparison to the conventional probabilistic model depicted
in Fig. 5(b). Obviously, the proposed model better describes the
distribution of false detections.
To remove most of the type I false detections, we predefine a
corresponding region of interest (ROI) before detecting certain
facial features. The ROI acts as a geometrical constraint as in
AAM [9] and EBGM [51], thus precluding a large percent-
age of false detections. For those false detections that remain
within the ROI, we observed that the scale information of the
detection, which was normally neglected, actually provides a
very interesting insight. A concise principle to remove the false
acceptances is proposed: a minimal-scale detection within the
maximal-scale detection is mostly likely to be the true facial
landmark location. The reasoning of this principle is directly
related to the mechanism of the Viola–Jones method: First,
the detections within the maximal-scale detection have less
chance of being the type I false acceptances (i.e., random
errors), as they have been confirmed multiple times by the over-
lapped detections. Second, the minimal-scale detection within
the maximal-scale detection is most likely to be the accurate
one, excluding the type II false acceptances, as it is detected
on the finest scale. The type II false acceptances, therefore,
are employed as extra information to confirm the localization,
but are finally eliminated. In contrast, an additional statistical
model can potentially eliminate the type I false detections but,
in principle, cannot deal with the type II false detections, as they
are virtually very close.
Fig. 6 shows some examples from databases and uncon-
straint Internet and real-time images. To make the registration
sufficiently reliable in the automatic system, we have trained
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13 facial landmarks from the BioID databases, as shown in the
first image of Fig. 6. For registration, in theory, two landmarks
are enough to compute the rigid transformation, but more
landmarks are more robust in a minimum square error sense.
Occasional misses of the detection of certain landmarks occur,
but in most cases, the number of detected landmarks is large
enough for a reliable registration.
The robustness and speed of the facial feature detectors are
inherited from the Viola–Jones method, and the postselection
strategy that we proposed further strengthened their applica-
bility on an MPD. In summary, the proposed facial feature
detectors are extremely fast and self-standing, not requiring any
additional face shape or texture models, nor any interactive op-
timization. The trouble of learning statistical constraint models,
together with the modeling error, is avoided.
IV. ILLUMINATION NORMALIZATION
The variability on the face images brought by illumination
changes is one of the biggest obstacles for face verification.
It has been suggested that the variability caused by illumi-
nation changes easily exceeds the variability caused by iden-
tity changes [34]. Illumination normalization, therefore, is a
very important preprocessing step before verification. There
has been an intensive study on this topic in the literature,
which can be categorized into two different methodologies.
The first category tries to study the illumination problem in a
fundamental way by building up the physics imaging model
and restoring the 3-D face surface model, either in an explicit
or an implicit way. We call this category the 3-D methods,
which include the linear subspace method [40], illumination
cone [2], spherical harmonics [1], quotient image [41], etc.
The second category, however, does not rely on recovering the
full 3-D information, instead, they work directly on the 2-D
image pixel values. We call this category the 2-D methods,
which include histogram equalization [27], linear and homo-
graphic filters [22], the Retinex method [29], the diffusion
method [7], etc.
The 3-D methods aim at utilizing the 3-D information that
is robust to illumination. However, as converting the 3-D ob-
jects to the 2-D images is a process with loss of informa-
tion, the reverse process will unavoidably introduce regulations
or restrictions to make up for such loss, like fixed surface
normals [41], absence of shadow or specular reflections [40],
etc. In reality, such assumptions are very often violated and
introduce artifacts in the processed images [42]. Furthermore,
due to the complexity of the algorithm, 3-D methods normally
load a heavy computational burden on the face authentication
system. The 2-D methods, in contrast, are more direct and
much simpler. Because of this directness and simplicity, on
the other hand, it is not possible for 2-D methods to achieve
illumination invariance, as has been theoretically proved in
[8]. Therefore, instead of pursuing illumination invariance, we
aim for illumination insensitivity and the compromise between
computational cost and system performance. We proposed a
2-D illumination insensitive filter for the face authentication
system on the MPD, called the simplified local binary pattern
(LBP) filter.
LBP was initially proposed to solve the texture recognition
problem [35]. The fundamental idea is stated as follows: a 3× 3
neighborhood block in the image is thresholded by the value of
the center pixel and results in eight binary values. This eight-bit
binary sequence is then converted into a decimal value ranging
from 0 to 255, representing the type of the texture pattern in
the neighborhood of this central point. The distribution of the
LBP patterns throughout the image is then used as the feature
of the image. LBP histogram is recognized as a robust measure
of the local textures, insensitive to illumination and camera
parameters.
The LBP histogram is a good representation for images with
more or less uniform textures, but for face images, it is insuf-
ficient. A distribution disassociates the connection between the
patterns and their relative positions on a face and potentially
decreases differences among subjects and mingles them up in
space. To include the positional information, LBP can instead
be used as a preprocessing method on the image values [23].
Essentially, this acts as a nonlinear high-pass filter. As a result,
it emphasizes the edges that contain significant changes of
pixel values, but at the same time, it also emphasizes the noise
that involves only small changes of pixel values. The original
weights of LBP, i.e., exponentials of 2, differ greatly within the
neighborhood. For two neighboring pixels in the neighborhood,
they are at least two times different, and in worst cases, their
difference can be as large as 128 times. As noise occurs in a
random manner with respect to the eight directions, the way of
converting binary value to decimal value, i.e., the exponential
weights assigned on the neighbors, renders the LBP filtering
noise sensitive. To make the filtering more robust, we propose
to simplify the weighting process, assigning equal weights on
each of the eight neighbors. The noise is suppressed by not em-
phasizing circular differences and potentially averaging them
out within the neighborhood. We show some examples from the
YaleB database [20] in Fig. 7, in which the proposed simplified
LBP filtering and the original LBP filtering are compared. The
histogram equalization method is also illustrated as a reference.
The performance of the three illumination normalization meth-
ods will be compared in Section VII.
It is observed that the simplified LBP filtering produces
stable patterns under diverse illuminations, even under extreme
illuminations. There are several advantages brought by the
simplified LBP filtering. First, the LBP is a local measure, so
the LBPs in a small region are not affected by the illumination
conditions in other regions. Second, the measure is relative, and
therefore, is strictly invariant to any monotonic transformation,
such as shifting, scaling, or logarithm, of the pixel values.
Third, we largely reduce the sensitivity of the LBP value to
noise by assigning uniform weights in all eight directions.
Finally, even for the MPD with limited computation resources,
the proposed filtering operation is extremely fast.
The immediate concern is that simplified LBP filtering may
filter out too much information from the face image, as both
illumination-sensitive components and some face-related com-
ponents are discarded. This problem can be solved in a system-
atic manner by introducing a classification method that has high
discrimination capability such that the part of information loss
caused by simplified LBP filtering is negligible. In Section V,
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the illumination normalization methods. (a) Original face images. (b) Histogram-equalized images. (c) Images filtered by the original
LBP. (c) Images filtered by the simplified LBP.
Fig. 8. Distributions of the two classes for the face detection case and the face
verification case, respectively. Decision boundaries are also illustrated.
with special regards to this problem, we will discuss the gen-
eralization and discrimination capabilities of the classifier in a
high-dimensional space and justify the simplified LBP filter for
the illumination normalization purpose.
It is worth mentioning that the illumination problem can also
be tackled from a hardware point of view. The near-infrared
illumination, for example, provides more consistent images in
diverse lighting situations and also enables face authentication
at night [28].
V. FACE VERIFICATION
In this section, we address the problem of verifying the
detected, registrated, and normalized image pattern. Under the
context of our application, this is a two-class classification
problem, with the two classes defined as the user and the
nonuser (or impostor) classes.
Although similar to the face detection problem in the sense
that both are two-class classification problems, the face verifica-
tion problem is different in the distribution of the two classes.
An illustration is given in Fig. 8. In the verification case, the
user class and the impostor class are more closely distributed
in space than the two classes in the detection case. In other
words, the chance that an impostor face resembles a user face
is much higher than the chance that a random background
patch resembles a face patch. In the detection case, a number
support vectors, as shown in Fig. 8, are sufficient to “support”
the decision boundary. In the recognition case, however, the
distribution of the two classes are intermingled in a more com-
plex way. This implies that the boundary-based classification
methods that work well on the face detection problem, like the
support vector machine method [11], which relies explicitly
on the support vectors, or the Viola–Jones Adaboost method,
which relies implicitly on the highly weighted samples, are no
longer suitable for the verification problem. The better solution,
instead, is to classify in the overlapped regions with a minimal
possible error, from a statistical point of view. For this reason,
we propose to verify the feature vectors in a statistically optimal
way using the likelihood ratio.
The likelihood ratio is an optimal statistic in the
Newman–Pearson sense [49]: At a given FAR, the likelihood
ratio achieves a minimal FRR; or at a given FRR, the decision-
fused classifier reaches a minimal FAR. The likelihood ratio
classification rule is defined as
L(x) =
p(x|ω)
p(x|ω¯) > T (1)
where x is the preprocessed face image, which is stacked into
a vector, ω is the user class, ω¯ is the nonuser class, T is
the threshold. When L(x) > T , x is accepted as the genuine
user; otherwise, it is rejected. Since we assume infinitely many
subjects in the sets ω ∪ ω¯, exclusion of a single subject ω from
it virtually does not change the distribution of x. Therefore, the
following holds:
p(x|ω¯)  p(x) (2)
which facilitates an even simpler modeling of the two classes
conceptually as two overlapping clouds in a high-dimensional
space, as shown in Fig. 8. The two classes are now the user-face
class and the all-face (or background) class.
To obtain the likelihood ratio of an input feature vector x
with respect to two classes ω and ω¯, the probability density
functions of the two classes p(x|ω) and p(x) are first estimated.
The Gaussian assumption is often applied on a large set of data
samples, which is motivated by the central limit theorem [16].
Given N sample feature vectors of the face xi, i = 1, . . . , N ,
both μ and Σ can be estimated as follows:
μ=
1
N−1
N∑
i=1
xi Σ=
1
N−1
N∑
i=1
(xi−μ)(xi−μ)T . (3)
To avoid the influence of extreme samples, which are pos-
sibly caused by extraordinary illumination, pose, expression,
or misregistration, μ can also take the median of the sample
vectors at every element: μ = median(x1, . . . , xN ).
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The two classes involved in face verification are the user
class ωuser and the background class ωbg. Equivalently, the
likelihood ratio in (1) can be rewritten as
lnL(x) = ln p(x|ωuser)− ln p(x|ωbg)
=
1
2
(
ln |Σbg|+ (x− μbg)TΣ−1bg (x− μbg)
)
− 1
2
(
ln |Σuser|+ (x− μuser)TΣ−1user(x− μuser)
)
=
1
2
(dMaha(x|ωbg)− dMaha(x|ωuser)) + c (4)
where μuser, μbg, Σuser, Σbg are the means and covariances
of the user and background classes, respectively. The term c =
1/2(ln |Σbg| − ln |Σuser|) is a constant that can be absorbed
into the threshold T in (1) without influencing the final receiver
operating characteristic (ROC). As (4) shows, the logarithm
essentially reduces the likelihood ratio to the difference be-
tween the two squared Mahalanobis distances in the user and
background classes.
It is useful to further study the discrimination capability
and generalization capability of the likelihood ratio classifier.
Generalization capability and discrimination capability are two
equally important aspects in verification. For our MPD appli-
cation, they are closely related to the convenience requirement
and the security requirement, respectively.
We notice that the face verification is normally in a very high
dimensional space. A small-enough face image, for example, of
size 32 × 32, already has 1024 pixels, which implies a 1024-
dimensional feature vector. High-dimensional space potentially
has great power of discrimination but is relatively difficult
to generalize [44]. We explain this with a simple example
using the model in Fig. 8(b). Suppose each of the user and
the background class take up a hypersphere with radii ruser
and rbg = a · ruser, a > 1, in an N -dimensional space. For a
single dimension, the ratio of volume between the two spaces is
Vbg/Vuser = a, which means that given an arbitrary point in the
1-D space, the chances that it belongs to the background class
ωbg is a times of the chance that it belongs to the user class
ωuser. From all the N dimensions, however, the ratio becomes
Vbg/Vuser = aN . When N is large, e.g., N = 1000, and a
takes a moderate value, e.g., a = 1.5, aN = 1.51000 ∼ 10176 is
almost infinite. This implies that for an arbitrary N -dimensional
feature vector, the chance that it falls into the user class ωuser
is almost none. In other words, the discrimination capability of
such a likelihood-ratio classifier in the high-dimensional space
is very high, whereas to generalize, the feature vector of the
user image taken under different situations must be able to stay
within an extremely small region.
This trait, on the other hand, justifies the proposed illumi-
nation normalization method in Section IV, in which more
emphasis is put on maintaining the generalization capability,
rather than the discrimination capability. The large reduction
of the image information (restricted LBP values) by the sim-
plified LBP filter makes both class much smaller in volume
after illumination normalization. In comparison to the user
class, the background class is more substantially reduced, as
the method also discards certain information that is useful
for discriminating different subjects. Consequently, the relative
volume between ωbg and ωuser is reduced, or equivalently, a is
reduced. When aN is not so prohibitively high, the generaliza-
tion becomes easier. Most importantly, the discarded informa-
tion contains a large illumination-sensitive component, which
greatly increases the generalization capability across different
illuminations. Meanwhile, enough discrimination capability is
preserved because of the high dimensionality of the space.
VI. INFORMATION FUSION
Fusion is a popular practice to increase the reliability of the
biometric verification [37], [45] and has been applied in face
recognition tasks [28], [31], [32]. In our face authentication
system, as shown in Fig. 2, the fusion is done between differ-
ent frames. This not only improves the system performance,
but also realizes the ongoing authentication, as introduced in
Section I.
From each frame, we obtain a value of its likelihood ratio
and compare it to a threshold to make the decision.2 We have
compared the following three different types of fusion methods
1) sum of the scores [17] and 2) AND and 3) OR of the decisions,
which are equivalent to the min and max rules of the scores
[43]. Theoretically, summation of log likelihood ratios acts in a
similar way as a naive Bayes classifier [16] and can achieve
the nearly optimal performance despite certain dependencies
between consecutive frames [15]. In practice, however, we ob-
served that the OR rule decision fusion yields still better results
in our authentication system. This is, again, explained by the
fact that the classifier possesses strong discrimination capability
that tends to reject the authentic user occasionally. An OR
operation, obviously, makes the classifier more prone to accept
than to reject. As a result, it decreases the FRR, but at a very
low FAR, because the chance that the two successive frames
is falsely accepted are even lower than what we discussed in
Section V. To illustrate the fusion performances, ROCs will be
shown in Section VII.
VII. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Data Collection
To learn the probability density functions of the user class
p(x|ωuser) and the background class p(x|ωbg), a large number
of samples are required.
The background sample set is be taken from public face
databases. In the experiments, we adopt the following four
databases: 1) the BioID database [46]; 2) the FERET database
[47]; 3) the YaleB database [20]; 4) and the FRGC database
[48]. The faces are detected and registrated using the methods
proposed in Sections II and III. Each face is registrated to the
size of 32 × 32 and elongated into a 1024-dimensional feature
vector. The databases, in total, result in more than 10 000
samples for training in the background class.
2To compute the ROC, the threshold is a changing value [16], and its value in
the final system should be calibrated on the ROC based on certain requirements
of the FAR or FRR.
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Fig. 9. Examples of four session images of the same subject.
The user sample set is obtained by taking face images from
the MPD. We used the Eten M600 PDA as the mobile device.
In practice, the user set is convenient to collect: at a frame
rate of 15 fps, a 2-min video results in 1800 frames of face
images. In total, the data of 20 users have been collected from
volunteers, with four independent sessions for each subject,
taken at different times and under different illuminations. Fig. 9
shows examples of the same subject taken in four sessions.
Additionally, to increase the variance of the samples as well
as the tolerance to registration, the training set is extended
by flipping and creating slightly shifted, rotated, and scaled
versions of the face image.
B. Test Protocol
For one specific user, we learn the density of the user class
from the user data of one session and compute the testing
genuine scores, i.e., the log likelihood ratios, from the user
data of the other three independent sessions. The density of the
background class is learned from the public database, and the
impostor scores are computed from our collected data of
the other 19 subjects. As a result, for the user, we have around
1800 images for training and 5400 for validation. On the
impostor side, we have around 10 000 public database faces for
training and 100 000 collected faces of other subjects for vali-
dation. Note that the training and testing data of the background
class are independent in the setting. Using the public databases
as the training data is convenient for the MPD implementation,
as the background parameters need to be calculated only once
and stored for all the users. On the other hand, obtaining the
impostor scores from our own database is of more interest than
obtaining them from the public database because the impostor
face images in our own database are collected under more or
less the same situations as in the enrollment and, thus, more
meaningful and critical for testing the verification performance.
Given the likelihood ratios obtained from the two classes, the
ROC can be obtained to evaluate the performance of the system.
Information fusion is further done, as described in Section VI.
C. Results on Mobile Data
We show the system performance of fusing two frames with
certain intervals t. The longer the interval is, the lower the
dependency. We test different time intervals t of 0.2, 1, and
30 s. Fig. 10 shows the scatter plot of log likelihood ratios
of two frames, as well as the ROCs of fusion at different time
intervals t. The ROCs are drawn in the logarithm scale. It can
be observed that the AND rule decision fusion does not bring
any improvement; instead, it degrades the performance due to
the fact that it increases the discrimination capability that is
already very high. In comparison, the OR rule decision fusion
works particularly well and outperforms the sum rule. As can be
further observed, with the increase of t, the improvement of per-
formance by fusion becomes more pronounced. When t = 1 s,
the equal-error rate (EER) of the ROC by the OR rule decision
fusion is already reduced to half of the original. For the MPD
application, if we do ongoing authentication at a time interval
of 30 s, an EER of 2% can be achieved. Fusing more frames will
further increase the performance. Experiments have also shown
that a much lower EER can be achieved if the enrollment and
testing are done across sessions of closer illuminations.
D. Results on YaleB Data
The algorithm has also been tested on Yale database B [20],
which contains the images of ten subject, each seen under 576
viewing conditions (9 poses × 64 illuminations). For the YaleB
database, which emphasizes on illumination, we compare three
different illumination normalization methods, namely, simpli-
fied LBP preprocessing, original LBP preprocessing, and his-
togram equalization. Examples of Yale database B and the
effects of illumination normalization are shown in Fig. 7. The
result of unpreprocessed images is also presented for reference.
In our test, for each subject, the user data are randomly
partitioned into 80% for training and 20% for testing. The data
of the other nine subjects are used as the impostor data. The
face verification is exactly the same as in the mobile device
case. To illustrate the performances, we used the EER as the
performance measure. The random partition process is carried
out 20 rounds for each subject. We obtain an average EER
for each of the ten subjects. As a result, the performances of
different illumination methods are compared in Fig. 11.
It can be seen in Fig. 11 that for all the subjects in the
Yale database B, the simplified LBP preprocessing consistently
achieves the best performance. This indicates that the simplified
LBP preprocessing has higher robustness to large illumination
variability. As the proposed system balances between gen-
eralization and discrimination by putting much emphasis on
generalization among different imaging situations in the illu-
mination normalization part, while on discrimination between
user and impostor in the face verification part, the experimental
results on the YaleB database indicates that the distribution of
emphasis is effective in practice, i.e., on a system level, the
generalization capability is guaranteed at little loss of discrimi-
nation capability.
E. Implementation
The efficiency of the proposed system enables realistic
implementation of this system on an MPD. We chose the
Eten M500 Pocket PC for demonstration and transformed our
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Fig. 10. (Left column) Scatter plot and (right column) ROC comparison at different time intervals t: 0.2, 1, 30 s. (a) t = 0.2 s. (b) t = 1 s. (c) t = 30 s.
algorithms that are written in the C language onto the Windows
Mobile 5 platform of the device. We used the Intel OpenCV
library [26] to facilitate the implementation.
In the preliminary experiments, the enrollment is on the
PC: the MPD takes a sequence of the user images of about
2 min and transfers them to the PC to process them, with
the user mean and covariance extracted for calculating the
Mahalanobis distance in the user class. The background mean
and covariance have been prestored in the mobile device for
calculating the Mahalanobis distance in the background class.
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Fig. 11. Comparison of the ROCs using different illumination normalization
methods (top down): simplified LBP, Gaussian derivative filter, zero-mean and
unit-variance normalization, original LBP, histogram equalization, high-pass
filtering, and the unpreprocessed.
The user image sequences then pass through the diagram in
Fig. 2 until the final decision of acceptance or rejection is made.
The implementation of the system in the project framework has
been reported in [14].
Even without optimization, our system has already achieved
a frame rate of 10 frames/s on the laptop with an Intel(R) central
processing unit, 1.66 GHz, and 2 GB of random access memory
(RAM). On the mobile device, with the Samsung S3C2440
400 MHz processor and 64 MB of synchronous dynamic RAM,
the time is longer—about 8 s a frame. Profiling of the sys-
tem indicates that the face detection and registration are still
the most time-consuming part, compared to the illumination
normalization and verification components that are extremely
fast. This system will become practical in use with further
optimization on both hardware and software, particularly when
detection and registration can be implementation by hardware,
transferring the Haar-like features into fast circuit units.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Face verification on the MPD provides a secure link between
the user and the PN. In this paper, we have presented a biometric
authentication system, from face detection, face registration,
illumination normalization, face verification, to information
fusion. Both theoretical concerns and practical concerns are
given.
The series of solutions to the five modules proves to be
efficient and robust. In addition, the different modules collab-
orate with each other in a systematic manner. For example,
downscaling the face in the detection module provides very fast
localization of the face, at the cost of coarser scales, but the sub-
sequent registration module immediately compensates for the
accuracy. The same is true for the illumination normalization
and verification modules, where the latter well accommodates
the former. The final system achieves an equal error rate of
2%, under challenging testing protocols. The low hardware and
software cost of the system makes it well adaptable to a large
range of security applications.
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